Post-hanoi Prospects

By Tong Kim

The US-North Korea summit in Hanoi ended without any agreement; a setback for both parties. This summit was not expected to produce a major breakthrough like a comprehensive package deal toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea Yet, the setback came as somewhat of a surprise to most people.

The essence of the summit failure lay in the fundamental disparity in their approach to negotiations and the mismatch of offers from both sides.

From the beginning, the North insisted on a phased, synchronized denuclearization process.

The US side recently seemed willing to accept that approach; however, in Hanoi, President Donald Trump apparently sought a 'big deal' that would provide an agreed scope and a general roadmap to denuclearization.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was simply not ready for this kind of deal.

He offered verified dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, consisting of more than 300 buildings, in trade for a major lifting of sanctions.

Kim's foreign minister Ri Young-ho said the North demanded only a partial lifting, refuting Trump's characterization of lifting 'sanctions in their entirety.

' In fact both were right. Ri was technically right because they sought the lifting of five out of 11 UN sanction packages.

Trump was right in terms of the impact of lifting the sanctions that the North wanted.

If Kim had thought he could get what he wanted based on the supposed good relationship between Trump and him built through mutual flattery and 'love letters' or based on an assessment of Trump's domestic political needs, he was wrong.

Trump was equally wrong if he had thought he could secure the kind of deal he wanted, simply by painting the concept of a bright future for North Korea as an 'economic powerhouse,' while keeping all the sanctions in place until after complete denuclearization. From the North's perspective, Trump's offer was a mismatch of words and actions.

The US offers of incentives such as ending the Korean War or setting up liaison offices or a bright economic future for the North were not enough for the North to give up the Yongbyon facilities, which constitute a major portion of the North's nuclear program

Beyond Yongbyon, the North is believed to be operating more nuclear production sites, producing enriched uranium to make more nuclear bombs. Kim's proposal did not mention what he would do with his nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles or chemical and biological weapons.

The North...